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THE NEGOTIATION OF THE ROME
STATUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND INTERNATIONAL
LAWMAKING IN THE 2 1 ST CENTURY
John Washburn'
In Rome, on the night of July 17-18, 1998, there was an
international epiphany.2 The world community agreed by 120
votes that the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court should be adopted.3 In so doing, diplomats abandoned
themselves to cheers and chants, tears and embraces, and
rhythmic stomping and applause. In this moment of celebra-
tion and recognition, many of them saw the future of interna-
tional law transformed. 4 The International Criminal Court
1 John Washburn, is co-chairman of the Washington Working Group on the
International Criminal Court and a former U.S. Foreign Service officer and United
Nations official. He attended most of the meetings of the United Nations Prepara-
tory Committee on the International Criminal Court and all of the Diplomatic Con-
ference on the International Criminal Court in Rome. Much of the author's
argument in this note was developed in the course of his experience of working
with Fanny Benedetti on their article: Fanny Benedetti and John L. Washburn,
Drafting of the International Criminal Court Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an
Afterward on the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, (Jan. -
Mar. 1999). He is grateful for her expertise and insight as lawyer, observer, ana-
lyst, and co-author. Any errors here, however, are entirely his own.
2 "[E]piphany... 3a: (1) a usually sudden manifestation or perception of the
essential nature of something. (2) an intuitive grasp of reality through something
(as an event) usually simple and striking. (3) an illuminating discovery. 3b: a
revealing scene or moment." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 390
(Frederick C. Mish ed., 10 th ed. 1993).
3 See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Inter-
national Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/2 (1998)
[hereinafter PrepCom Report]. Since the conference report, this final text at Rome
has had many technical corrections. At the time of writing, the most complete
version is available only through the United Nations web page (visited Oct. 15,
1999) <http://www.un.org./icc/statute/romefa.htm>.
4 The author attended all of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, in
Rome, Italy, during 15 June - 17 July, 1998. This account is based on his discus-
sions with numerous participants from governments, the United Nations officers of
1
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(ICC) and its statute would fundamentally change the applica-
tion and enforcement of international criminal law. In addition
to its effect on the substance of international criminal law, the
negotiations of the Rome Statute, which began as traditional
treaty making, had become a very different kind of multilateral
legislation by parliamentary diplomacy.
This article discusses this process and the impact it may
have on the future of international lawmaking. Part I describes
the process leading to the Rome Statute. Part II compares the
process to national lawmaking in parliaments and legislatures.
Part III discusses the difficulties of the participation of the
United States in the ICC negotiations. In conclusion, Part IV
considers the final form of the negotiation to create a charter of
the ICC as a model and precedent for international lawmaking
in the Twenty-first century.
PART I: HISTORY OF ROME STATUTE
Negotiations for the establishment of a permanent institu-
tion that would be responsible for trying the gravest breaches of
humanitarian violations began in 1995 with a United Nations
General Assembly resolution convening the United Nations
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court (PrepCom).5 The purpose of the
PrepCom, as mandated by the General Assembly, was to create
a text that could later be adopted by States. The PrepCom had
"to prepare a widely acceptable consolidated text of a conven-
tion for an international criminal court."6 The PrepCom began
with a preliminary text of sixty-eight articles from the Interna-
tional Law Commission. After nineteen weeks of formal meet-
ings to draft a comprehensive statute, the PrepCom sent to
the Conference, and non-governmental organizations. See also Giovanni Conso,
Looking to the Future, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT - THE MAKING OF
THE ROME STATUTE 471, 473 (Roy Lee ed., Kiuwer Law International 1999) [here-
inafter MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE].
5 See G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, 50 th Sess., Supp.No.49 at 307, U.N. Doc.
A/50/46 (1995). For the background and history of the ICC issue at the United
Nations, see THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1-35 (C. Bas-
siouni ed., Transnational Publishers 1998); Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 1,
at 2-5; Roy Lee, The Rome Conference and Its Contribution to International Law, in
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 4, at 1-6.
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Rome a draft convention of 116 articles with 1,700 brackets con-
taining disagreed language.
7
The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
was to complete the negotiations, drafting, and adoption of the
text within the five weeks allotted to it by the General Assem-
bly.8 It met during June 15 - July 17, 1998. The Statute
adopted in Rome had 128 articles, accompanied by a Final Act
and seven brief resolutions.9 As requested by Resolution F of
the Rome Statute, in late 1998 the General Assembly author-
ized the creation of the United Nations Preparatory Commis-
sion for the International Criminal Court (Commission).10
The negotiations for the Rome Statute were, therefore, a
United Nations (U.N.) process from start to finish. The culture,
physical location, logistics, conference practices, and Secretariat
of the U.N. profoundly affected all aspects of the negotiations.
These aspects included the primary individual actors; collective
participants including government delegations, Bureau mem-
bers, 1 non-governmental organizations and support staff; the
schedule; and physical and financial resources.
7 See generally Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/2/
Add.1 (1998).
8 See G.A. Res. 52/160, U.N. GAOR, 5 2nd Sess., Supp. No. 32, U.N. Doc. Al
RES/52/32 (1997).
9 See PrepCom Report, supra note 3.
10 See G.A. Res.53/105, U.N. G.A.O.R., 53' Sess., Supp. No. 105, U.N. Doc. A/
Res/53/105 (1998). The General Assembly authorized the PrepCom to meet in
1999 during 16-26 February, 26 July - 13 August, and 29 November - 17 Decem-
ber. Two more meetings are expected in 2000 and at least one more in 2001. The
PrepCom must complete recommendations on Rule of Procedure and Evidence and
Elements of Crimes by June 30, 2000, and administrative and budgetary proposals
before the first meeting of the Court's executive body, the Assembly of States
Parties.
11 The "Bureau" in UN practice includes all elected officials of a UN body or
conference. These are members of government delegations. Closely associated
with these officials, and often included in broader use of the term, are members of
the Secretariat assigned to assist the officials and other persons they may appoint
as Conference secretaries, rapporteurs, coordinators, drafters and the like. The
complete formal lists of the elected officials of all bodies of the Conference and of its
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The status of the PrepCom and the Rome Conference as
subordinate bodies of the General Assembly meant that they
began with the Assembly's internal politics, traditions and par-
liamentary practices, rules of procedure and institutional mem-
ory. In particular, debates in the Assembly's Sixth Committee,
which prepared the resolutions authorizing the establishment
and annual meetings of the PrepCom and the convening of the
Rome Conference, gave governments an opportunity to review
the progress of the negotiations and to consider the Interna-
tional Criminal Court in light of broader current events. Unfor-
tunately, they also tended to reintroduce into the negotiating
process the caucus behavior and the contentious political issues
of the General Assembly. Nonetheless, governments began to
abandon these early in the PrepCom, and later in the Rome
Conference. The Sixth Committee's discussions also inevitably
put the ICC negotiations into competition with all other con-
tenders for the limited financial, human, and space resources of
the U.N.
The U.N. as a venue, institution, and community was also
the primary shaper of the psychology of the negotiations. Many
of the delegates, and almost all of the Secretariat officials and
key Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) representatives,
knew each other personally or by reputation at the start of the
negotiations, remained in the negotiations through the diplo-
matic conference in Rome, and are now at work in the PrepCom
in New York. Knowledge of each other's styles, personalities,
and abilities - both strengths and weaknesses - provided confi-
dence, predictability and mutual forbearance. The value of this
confidence was demonstrated clearly when the designated
chairman for the Rome Conference, Adriaan Bos, became ill in
April 1998. Philippe Kirsch of Canada was easily chosen as the
replacement because he was so well known in the U.N. commu-
nity from his long service in many international bodies and con-
ferences, particularly as the chairman of challenging
conferences on terrorism and international humanitarian law.
Experience in the U.N. system gave many participants a
strong, often emotional, commitment to the ideals and purposes
of the ICC. Confidence in the process clearly came from the
work of the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugo-
slavia. Moreover, each of the hundreds of conflicts and the mil-
[Vol. 11:361
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lions of lives lost in the last fifty years has been on the agenda of
some part of the U.N. In their speeches in the negotiations for
the ICC, countries such as Sierra Leone, Argentina, Germany,
Bosnia and Sri Lanka spoke powerfully of their countries' histo-
ries of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
For the same reasons, and for some of its own, the U.N. and
its Secretary-General made an early and irreversible institu-
tional commitment to the ICC. The Court would be a powerful
expression in action of the U.N. Charter. Its creation would
demonstrate the relevance and importance of the U.N. at the
millennium, and its existence would open the way for the com-
ing of other international institutions to complement and
strengthen the evolving place of the U.N. in the international
governance of the future. 12 Accordingly, and even in the face of
opposition to the emerging court from powerful countries such
as China and the United States, the U.N. Secretariat commit-
ted itself to the establishment of a permanent International
Criminal Court.
Thus, the U.N. support group assigned to the negotiation
from the Office of Legal Affairs and Codification Division could
begin its work with unusual confidence in the permanent back-
ing of the Secretariat from the top down. Nonetheless, the cen-
tral importance of the work of the Secretariat to the
negotiations was, as customary at the U.N., deliberately down-
played by many of the officials concerned themselves. In fact,
collectively the Secretariat combined mastery of the issues, fa-
miliarity with the players, and long experience with similar ne-
gotiations in a way that could be matched by few other
participants in the negotiations.
The ultimate result, the Rome Statute, was part legislation
and part constitution. In providing a detailed jurisprudence to
the ICC and its judges, it created a system of international
criminal law.13 At the same time, it was also the charter of a
new international institution including its governance, admin-
istration, structure, financing, and fundamental procedures.
The U.N. has long had considerable success in establishing
norms and standards. It has had much less in devising institu-
12 See Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 4, at 23, 37.
13 See Roy Lee, The Rome Conference and its Contribution to International
Law, supra note 4, at 31-32.
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tions to implement them. The Rome Statute, by calling on its
negotiators to do both, was a venture so new that it seemed to
open the future.
As finally refined in Rome, the structure, organization and
operational process of the negotiations had several unique char-
acteristics. Negotiations were always conducted on an existing
("rolling") text, not on accumulations of proposals. Thus, dis-
cussion of any particular issue could be related to a complete
draft of the statute. To achieve this, each individual proposal
by a State appeared as a separate U.N. document. Following
negotiation of this document, a revised text was issued indicat-
ing any suggested changes that had been proposed. This made
it clear to the participants that changes were encouraged and
should be negotiated. In addition, this procedure led delega-
tions to combine their ideas, thus producing documents that in-
cluded the proposals of many States. As a result, States had the
benefit of having support for their proposals on paper prior to
formal discussions. Once the negotiation of a document was
complete, a final draft would be issued and incorporated into
the integral, but constantly changing draft text of the whole
statute.
The Rome diplomatic conference was also characterized by:
* Thoughtfully aggressive chairmanship in different
styles by Adriaan Bos (PrepCom) and Philippe Kirsch
(Rome);
* The judicious use of papers prepared by the Bureau to
propose compromises, address impasses, and restore
momentum;
* Wide and intense inter-sessional activities to maximize
the effectiveness of formal meetings such as: substan-
tive conferences of all sizes and varieties to frame is-
sues for the next formal session; organizational
meetings of the Bureau and/or U.N. officials to prepare
agendas, candidacies of officers, and programs for quick
approval at the opening of a session;14
* During formal sessions, simultaneous work on large
and small pieces of the rolling text by very numerous
groups and sub-groups ranging from formal working
14 See id at 14-22.
366 [Vol. 11:361
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groups that were part of the established structures of
the PrepCom and the Rome Conference to negotiating
parties of all sizes;
* The replacement of the caucuses in the General Assem-
bly (with the partial exception of the Non-Aligned
Movement), by regional and global groups that were de-
veloped and based around common interests in the ICC.
The Like-Minded Group (LMG) was by far the most im-
portant of these;
* The indispensability of U.N. officials ranging from the
Secretary-General to conference secretaries, who
served in varied roles as intermediaries, facilitators,
advisers, and energizers for the Chairman and the
Bureau;
* The power and influence of non-governmental organiza-
tions: Of its 800 member organizations, the NGO Coali-
tion for an International Criminal Court (CICC)
accredited to Rome over 200 institutions with 450 rep-
resentatives. The coordination and support of these by
the CICC and its worldwide computer network and in-
formation system, profoundly influenced every aspect of
the Conference and deserved much of the credit for its
success.
U.N. officials, although originally wary that NGOs might be
disruptive or irritating to delegations, quickly found reassur-
ance in the established place of NGOs at the U.N. and the
CICC's general success in inducing NGO representatives to ob-
serve meeting decorum. In the end, the U.N. support team for
the bureaus of PrepCom and the Rome Conference worked with
the CICC as an ally, supporter, and source of invaluable polit-
ical and expert support.
Another three-way interconnection developed between the
(LMG), the CICC and the bureaus. "Like-minded" groups are a
familiar element in negotiations at the U.N. They are usually
improvised caucuses of governments with similar views about
one or a few issues and are formed by delegates in temporary
negotiating situations. The LMG, however, was founded during
the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 1996 and as of
early 2000 is still in full operation in the Preparatory Commis-
sion. Moreover, its members shared and agreed on a set of prin-
19991
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ciples, arrived at in Rome, which expressed a detailed vision of
the nature and values of the Court. The founders of the LMG
soon found that they were not alone in their reactions to the
twentieth century history of European atrocities and mass
crimes, which created and energized their commitment to the
Court. Latin American and African countries had the same
feelings over their own experiences in their continents with sim-
ilar crimes by dictators and colonizers and, over time, became
ready to join in the same commitment.
Decisions to join the LMG by countries such as the United
Kingdom and South Africa thus became important policy ques-
tions, and were taken as such in capitals by senior officials and
political leaders. The LMG grew to some sixty countries with
substantial membership from all areas of the world except Asia.
Another twenty countries were closely in sympathy with the
LMG on most issues. Its leaders were Germany, Netherlands,
Australia, Canada, Argentina and (later) South Africa. The
LMG became a central negotiating bloc with close and mutu-
ally supporting relations with the Dutch and Canadian chair-
men of the PrepCom and the Rome Conference. At Rome, the
LMG and the CICC formed an increasingly overt alliance. The
two groups exchanged information, expertise, strategies, and
moral support. Early in the PrepCom, individual NGOs began
to cooperate with the LMG in negotiating and lobbying. 15
The structure and pattern of negotiations in the PrepCom
and at the Rome Conference fit well with these interactions
among the principal group players. The formal working groups
in both the Commission and the Conference were supported by
coordinators appointed by the respective bureaus who facili-
tated the discussion of individual issues by the myriad working
parties of all sizes. With the exception of Part Two on the juris-
diction of the Court and a few very technical issues, this system
was applied to the entire Statute. Chairpersons of working
groups and coordinators were held responsible to submit only
agreed, unbracketed language to the Committee of the Whole
for forwarding to the drafting committee.
Both the LMG and the CICC had coordinators and teams,
which were counterparts to those on the Conference system. In
15 See Philippe Kirsch, The Development of the Rome Statute, supra note 4, at
15. See also Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 1, at 18, 20-21, 30-31.
[Vol. 11:361
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several cases, the coordinators for the Conference and LMG
were the same.16 These formal and informal negotiating
processes in the Conference, and their somewhat less elaborate
forerunners in the PrepCom, enhanced the effectiveness of the
LMG as a negotiating bloc and promoted its growth. They of-
fered many avenues for the formidable expertise, written and
oral, of the CICC members and helped them to respond timely
to twists and turns in the negotiations.
In the special case of Part Two, the interaction, partly tacit
and partly deliberate, between the LMG, the CICC and the Bu-
reau including its U.N. support staff, made all the difference.
From the very beginning of the ICC negotiations, all parties rec-
ognized that the final form of this section of the Statute would
determine the eventual effectiveness and viability of the Court.
They also agreed that it contained the hardest and most intrac-
table political and substantive problems in the Statute, which
could only be settled by the senior representatives of govern-
ments at the Rome Conference. This forecast proved to be pain-
fully true. Part Two remained a challenge and a threat
throughout the Rome Conference, which ended with a dramati-
cally unsuccessful effort by the United States to restrict further
the provisions in Part Two on the ability of states to bring cases
directly to the Court.
In the final Statute, Part Two, in sixteen articles, covers
these definitive aspects of the Court: the crimes it may try and
their basic elements, the limited ways that cases may reach it,
the place of the Security Council in its work, the duties and pre-
rogatives of the prosecutor, and rules and procedures for the
Court's determination of the admissibility of cases. The negoti-
ations on Part Two had to address these issues individually and
in their complex interconnections with each other.
The Bureau concluded in the first two weeks of the Confer-
ence that the differences between delegations on major sections
of Part Two were too great to be resolved in the coordinator-
working group process. These differences also raised the likely
prospect that there might have to be a vote on the Statute. Con-
fronted by these challenges, many other chairpersons of U.N.
negotiations might have sought another session of the diplo-
16 Author's personal observations.
1999] 369
9
PACE INT'L L. REV.
matic conference, negotiated privately for a consensus, asked a
group of "friends of the chairman" to prepare an alternate draft,
or tried some combination of these approaches. Instead, in an
impressive display of his deft and thoughtful aggressiveness,
Chairman Kirsch took charge of the negotiations on Part Two.
On July 5, he convened a meeting of twenty-eight countries rep-
resenting all major factions and regions to consider an informal
paper, which did not leave the meeting. On July 6, the Bureau
issued a comprehensive discussion paper. On July 9, Kirsch
opened a debate on Part Two in the Committee of the Whole in
which delegations were asked to confine themselves to answers
to a few specific questions presented by the Bureau. 17 While
the Bureau and many delegations kept private tallies of those
answers, the newsletter of the CICC published these overnight
after the close of the debate as "virtual votes." From these
events it became clear to all that a particular package for the
Statute could receive the votes of a large majority, that the core
of this majority was the LMG, and that the minority in opposi-
tion would be very small. In short, this version of the Statute
could win a majority so large and so representative of most re-
gions and of most categories of countries that it would be almost
as good as a consensus.
With this established, Kirsch moved rapidly to create the
"package" and to retain control of it in draft and in final form.
All negotiation on Part Two was kept in plenary sessions of the
Committee of the Whole, and only the Bureau prepared consec-
utive drafts. In a move shocking to some and criticized by
many, Kirsch also kept drafts of Part Two out of the Drafting
Committee. The Drafting Committee, adroitly chaired by
Cherif Bassiouni, had won praise and admiration for its success
in assimilating random agreed bits of provisions into smooth,
well-organized and skillfully integrated stretches of the text.
Kirsch nonetheless succeeded in keeping the Committee of the
Whole from referring Part Two to the Drafting Committee.
Late on the second to last day of the conference, he allowed the
Drafting Committee to look at, but not act on or keep, a tempo-
rarily circulated final text of Part Two.
17 See Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Jurisdiction of the Court, supra note 4, at 135.
370 [Vol. 11:361
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/4
NEGOTIATION OF THE ROME STATUTE
PART II: COMPARISON TO DOMESTIC LEGISLATION
The ICC negotiations inevitably invite comparison to na-
tional parliamentary and legislative processes. The many dif-
ferences are readily obvious. The caucuses were temporary
alliances for the single question of the ICC without the perma-
nence and ideological commitments of national political parties.
The PrepCom and the Rome Conference were not standing bod-
ies and had to invent themselves, especially as, bit by bit, they
abandoned much of the template of the General Assembly.
Moreover, they had no business other than the ICC. Finally, as
frequently remarked, the delegates were non-elected diplomats
accountable to governments, not to constituents.18
However, as the negotiations progressed, some of their as-
pects began to look more and more like national parliamentary
practices. Complex domestic legislation usually has to be nego-
tiated in fragments with the entire bill understood by most leg-
islators only when submitted to the whole chamber. The Rome
Conference found that only this method, although unusual in
normal diplomatic practice, could deliver the statute in five
weeks.
National constitutions frequently require a legislature to
produce periodic national laws, such as budgets. The legisla-
ture's speaker or president is often held responsible for ensur-
ing that this requirement is met. The leadership of the
PrepCom and the Rome Conference, including the U.N. officials
involved, strongly felt that a similar responsibility was imposed
on them by the authorizing General Assembly resolutions. Ac-
cordingly, their conduct of the negotiations, especially in Rome,
increasingly resembled the work of a leader of a national legis-
lature driving hard to pass a mandatory bill before its
deadline. 19
Voting is discouraged at the U.N. It is thought to promote
confrontation and to further weaken resolutions that in most
cases are not binding anyway. This was the practice also at the
18 See generally Alfred P. Rubin, A Critical View of the Proposed International
Criminal Court, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 139 (Fall 1999).
19 Author's personal observations and notes. See also Philippe Kirsch, The De-
velopment of the Rome Statute, supra note 4, at 451; Philippe Kirsch & John T.
Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiat-
ing Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 5-6, 9-11(1999).
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PrepCom and during the early part of the Rome Diplomatic
Conference. However, as it became clear on the eve of present-
ing the complete text to the whole conference that only a tiny
minority would oppose it, a final vote became not only thinkable
but also essential. Again, the meeting began to feel like a do-
mestic parliament.
Moreover, India and the United States offered what would
be called in the United States Congress, "killer amendments."20
These are amendments designed to make it impossible for a
piece of legislation to pass. In response, and through a tacit un-
derstanding with the Bureau, Norway made no-action motions
(equivalent to a congressional motion to lay on the table). Vig-
orously exercising his discretion, Chairman Kirsch put these to
the vote. Norway and its supporters made the familiar legisla-
tors' argument that a complex package, very carefully and
painstakingly negotiated, should not be altered so as to lose its
chance of passage. Both motions prevailed, and the final vote
on the statute was a foregone conclusion in favor.21
Extraordinary scenes of tension and jubilation followed in
the Committee of the Whole. As U.N. staff moved swiftly
through the crowded aisle counting hand votes, tension
mounted. Some delegates tried to make sure that the U.S. dele-
gation would be unable to see their votes. The defeat by enor-
mous majorities of the amendments offered by India and by the
U.S. insured the passage of the Statute and were greeted by
uproarious celebrations. In a bow to U.N. tradition, the proce-
dural motion to refer the Statute to the final plenary session of
the full Conference was taken by consensus.
A feature of the negotiations, which the future will see
again, is the overlap and interconnection, as in domestic legisla-
tures, between the main players in the negotiations. NGO ex-
perts turned up in government delegations, often with the
support and at the urging of the CICC or its members. The
elected officials of the Bureau had long experience with NGOs.
Moreover, the later General Assembly resolutions authorizing
PrepCom sessions and the Diplomatic Conference specifically
20 See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 183/c.1/L.94 and 95 (1998),
and U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/c.1/L.90 (1998).
21 See MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 4, at 23-26.
[Vol. 11:361372
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gave NGOs the right to attend them. This authorization, to-
gether with the recognition given to NGOs in the U.N. Charter,
gave them a more consistent and straightforward status in the
ICC negotiations than national lobbyists enjoy.22
PART III: UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE
ICC NEGOTIATIONS
The U.S. delegation had difficulties with the ICC negotiat-
ing process, both in the PrepCom, and especially in Rome.
There is considerable evidence that it had neither the flexible
but detailed instructions, nor the timely backstopping and re-
sponsiveness in its capital, enjoyed by other delegations from
comparable countries. 23 Whatever the truth of this, the U.S.
had certain problems, which may well recur for future Ameri-
can delegations in similar negotiations in any case.
Both at the Rome conference and after, the U.S. complained
that it was not consulted adequately by the Bureau on its most
important activities, especially in its repeated drafting of pro-
posed texts of Part Two and the literally last-minute prepara-
tion of the final package for the complete text of the Statute.
Many other countries had similar complaints, which the diffuse-
ness of the negotiations and the hard-driving style of the chair-
man made inevitable.
Nonetheless, for many observers, the U.S., in fact, had a
great deal of access. The U.S. was not an officer of the Commit-
tee,24 but did chair one of the Committee of the Whole's working
groups. The U.S. was also a vice-president of the entire confer-
ence, and a member of both the Committee of the Whole and the
Drafting Committee. The U.S. attended Kirsch's meeting on
July 15, 1998, where it vigorously protested being confronted
22 See U.N. CHARTER art. 71.
23 Interviews by author with members of the US delegation and representa-
tives of other countries during the Rome conference and the first Preparatory Com-
mission session in New York, 15 - 26 February, 1999. Interview by author with a
U.S. government official directly involved in activities concerning U.S. participa-
tion in the Rome conference, June 23, 1999, Washington, D. C. All of these inter-
locutors asked not to be identified. See also Michael P. Scharf, The Politics Behind
U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal Court, THE BROWN J. OF WORLD
AFF., Winter/Spring 1999, at 97.
24 The Committee, apart from the chairman, had only three vice-chairmen,
none of whom were from a major power, and Japan as rapporteur.
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with the Bureau text on Part Two, strenuously pursued its posi-
tion, and won several important concessions. The U.S. was con-
sulted informally almost every day by Kirsch, members of the
U.N. team, leaders of the LMG and of NGO's and by representa-
tives of the various negotiating groups and caucuses.
However, the true problem for the United States was its
exclusion from the constant private meetings of various combi-
nations of the LMG, representatives of the Bureau of the Com-
mittee of the Whole, the U.N. team and the leadership of the
CICC. It was through these various private meetings that the
chairman was provided with essential parts of his strategy, and
the discussions in them were an indispensable instrument for
pursuing those strategies. The mere fact that the U.S. delega-
tion was not a party to these discussions placed it at a clear
disadvantage.
The U.S. had important interests in almost every aspect of
the ICC. However, it belonged to no group or bloc in the negoti-
ations. Thus, it had too much to cover and no friends to repre-
sent its interests in meetings it could not physically attend.
Ironically, this large delegation from the remaining superpower
found itself in somewhat the same situation as tiny delegations
from small countries that also complained about being
swamped by too many concurrent meetings. In negotiations to
come as complicated and important as this, the U.S. will need to
consider the priority of its interests carefully and find allies to
share the burden of pursuing them. Another lesson of the ICC
negotiations is that in future large-scale conferences although
other delegations and the Bureau will try hard to accommodate
the U.S., and will sometimes make distasteful compromises to
do that, their acquiescence is not automatic.25 American confer-
ence diplomacy will need to substitute discussion of real inter-
ests and concerns for demands and complaints.
25 For example, see the description of the willingness of the Conference major-
ity to compromise substantially, but within limits, with the United States on a
proposal by South Korea about preconditions for the exercise of the Court's juris-
diction. See Wilmshurst, supra note 17, at 133-138.
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PART IV: THE ICC NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
The most important realization in the Rome experience is
large, yet simple: the international community is, in fact, capa-
ble of negotiating to agreement complicated international legal
instruments, which both codify existing law and create institu-
tions to implement them. Such future negotiations will carry a
much lighter burden of incredibility. What had seemed to be
impossible had, in fact, been achieved and other negotiations
will be encouraged by this example.
Moreover, in the last twenty years, the traditional conduct
of a diplomatic conference as a highly formal event conducted
by government representatives alone, has been changed by var-
ious conferences and meetings, many of which were sponsored
by the U.N. This traditional conduct was definitively altered by
the negotiations in the PrepCom and in Rome. Innovations in
the ICC negotiations were the combined result of experience
from the past, wise and courageous decisions in response to the
realities of the process, and perhaps some half-conscious bor-
rowings from national parliaments. In particular, it is now per-
manently established that at the U.N., small agreed pieces of
complicated multilateral legislation can be combined like a mo-
saic into a final document to be adopted as a whole.
The briefly convened sessions of negotiating bodies must be
prepared and supported by intense work between meetings to
frame administrative decisions and to organize, nominate,
strategize and to consult groups and leaders. Interim meetings
of the U.N. staff and the Bureau, both of them together and
with key governments, settled in advance much of the work or-
ganizing conferences which, otherwise, often leads to wrangling
as they start. A pre-Rome meeting of the PrepCom bureau and
the newly nominated officers of the diplomatic conference
achieved agreement on its basic structure and procedures.
When Adrian Bos, the expected chairman of the Committee of
the Whole, unexpectedly fell ill just before Rome, the U.N. team
was able, in informal consultations, to use the atmosphere of
understanding created in Courmayeur to win a smooth agree-
ment by its participants that Philippe Kirsch should replace
him. As a result, the participants of the Rome conference
agreed on all of the organizational arrangements without de-
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bate on its first day. Many of those present saw this as a good
omen for the rest of the Conference.
Inter-sessional meetings convened by NGOs and govern-
ments, and including representatives of all principal actors, are
essential to draft working papers, argue issues down to the
points which only inter-governmental negotiation can resolve
and identify unconscious premises and previously unspoken as-
sumptions. This kind of relaxed discussion, free of formal offi-
cial positions, is especially important in bridging gaps between
different cultures. For the ICC negotiations, this was essential
in dealing with different legal systems whose representatives
first had to understand each other's priorities and legal philoso-
phies, and then agree to hybridize them.
No single main collective actor in a negotiation like this can
act by itself; each has strengths, resources, and motives not
shared by the others and which they need to succeed. NGOs
have expertise that the other actors often underestimate. They
gain this expertise through their staff and their staffs volun-
teers and supporters, collective capacities, a reach into national
governments and an increasing reach into domestic public
opinion.
The U.N. has the broadest worldview, the largest multilat-
eral experience and special, rare technical expertise on interna-
tional lawmaking. Thus, although the U.N. always has its own
institutional interests in negotiations for which it is responsi-
ble, it must project objectivity. The U.N. was unusually willing
to reveal its own interests regarding the ICC.
NGOs often fail to understand the reality of the U.N. as an
inter-governmental organization and the limitations imposed
upon it. Governments still have dispositive power despite the
worldwide changes in the meaning and functions of sovereignty.
The spread of basic democracy means that a majority of govern-
ments in the U.N. are more representative than either the
NGOs or the secretariats of international institutions.
As for the elected officials of negotiating bodies, they can
take heart from the ICC experience that vigorous chairmanship
can be both acceptable and productive, but only if bold initia-
tives are preceded, accompanied, and followed up by endless pa-
tient consultation. They must have excellent political wisdom
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of their own, and get as much more of it as they can from the
other actors and especially from U.N. officials.
The ICC negotiations were made possible, sustained, and
brought to completion by their powerful psychology and by com-
pelling emotions, which were constantly renewed by current
events. Other negotiations will not have this advantage. How-
ever, they will gain another advantage from the ICC experience:
the knowledge that tired people in small groups haggling over
paragraphs can assemble historic international charters; that
skill, will and insight can bring success to international legisla-
tors, and that governments and peoples want some kinds of in-
ternational law and courts badly enough to do well in making
them.
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